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Up to a few years ago, economic theory did not pay any attention to the topic of firm 
financing. This situation has changed in recent years thanks to the development of a 
theoretical approach that has applied the conclusions of information economics to the analysis 
of the working of the financial markets. The purpose of this paper is to highlight the fact that 
the asymmetric information approach does not constitute the only theoretical framework 
which gives prominence to the issue of firm financing; a meaningful theory could be 
elaborated on the basis of the works of  Keynes and Schumpeter. The aim of this paper is to 










Up to a few years ago, economic theory did not pay any attention to the topic of firm 
financing, that is, the mechanisms through which firms procure the means of payment 
necessary to carry out their investment decisions. This lack of interest was common to the 
two principal macroeconomic theories, the keynesian theory and the monetarist one. Both 
were presented through models identifying the monetary sector solely with the money market.  
The Keynesian theory supported the thesis of the non-neutrality of money by using more 
or less sophisticated versions of the IS-LM model, according to which investment decisions 
depend only on the interest rate whose level is determined by the money market equilibrium. 
The implicit hypothesis in these models is that firms are always able to obtain the liquidity 
necessary to carry out the desired investments. This approach found important theoretical 
support in the Modigliani-Miller theorem that shows that a firm’s investment decisions are 
independent of the choice of the form of financing. The theorem shows that the cost of the 
capital, i.e. the rate of return that conditions the firm’s investment decisions, is independent of 
the decision regarding the source of financing, whether this be self-financing, a new share 
issue or indebtedness. For the firm, therefore, the choice between these forms of financing   2 
becomes indifferent and, for economic theory, firm financing becomes an issue of little 
importance.  
The monetarist theory motivates the irrelevance of the firm financing issue by stating that 
it is not possible to attribute to the credit market a role which is distinct from that played in 
the real sector, inasmuch as the credit market coincides with the real sector. This theory 
separates the money market from the credit market; Friedman e Schwartz (1982) assert that 
the two markets are characterised by different prices: the price of money corresponds to the 
quantity of goods that can be purchased with a unit of money, thus it is equal to the inverse of 
the price level, while the price of credit is the interest rate. Consequently, a disequilibrium 
between money supply and demand will be eliminated by the variation in the price of money 
and hence of the general price levels, while an imbalance between credit supply and demand 
will be eliminated by the variation in the interest rate. This distinction reflects the conclusions 
of the quantity theory of money according to which the imbalance between demand and 
supply influences the level of the aggregate demand and thus the price level. In the case of the 
credit market, however, any demand and supply disequilibrium will have no effect on the 
aggregate demand and on the price level. The absence of a link between the quantity of credit 
and the aggregate demand level is due to the fact that the credit demand and supply derive 
from real decisions: the credit supply is generated by saving decisions while the credit 
demand reflects investment decisions. The credit market coincides with the real sector of the 
economy, so it is pointless to study the relation between the credit market and the real sector.
1 
To leave aside the credit market means also to overlook the financial intermediaries, whose 
essential role is to facilitate the transfer of resources from savers to firms. We can apply  
Mill’s statement about money to financial intermediaries: 
 
“There cannot be intrinsically a more insignificant thing, in the economy of society, than 
money; except in the character of a contrivance for sparing time and labour. It is a machine for 
doing quickly and commodiously, what would be done, though less quickly and commodiously, 
without it: and like many other kinds of machinery, it only exerts a distinct and independent 
influence of its own when it gets out of order.. .”
2 
 
The intermediaries are considered a mechanism that makes it possible to do “quickly and 
commodiously ” what could be done even in their absence. 
This situation has changed in recent years thanks to the development of a  theoretical 
approach that has applied the conclusions of information economics to the analysis of the 
working of the financial markets and the role of financial intermediaries. The objective of this 
paper is to highlight the fact that the asymmetric information approach does not constitute the 
only theoretical framework which gives prominence to the issue of firm finance; a meaningful 
theory could be elaborated on the basis of the works of  Keynes and Schumpeter. The aim of 
this paper is to highlight the most significant differences between these two approaches.  
                                                 
1 Mc Callum (1989, pp. 29-30) states that the decision to overlook the credit market “… rests basically on the 
fact that in making their borrowing and lending decisions, rational households (and firms) are fundamentally 
concerned with goods and services consumed or provided at various points in time. They are basically 
concerned, that is, with choices involving consumption and labor supply in the present and in the future. But 
such choices must satisfy budget constraints and thus are precisely equivalent to decisions about borrowing and 
lending- that is, supply and demand choices for financial assets. … Consequently there is no need to consider 
both types of decisions explicitly.  … it is seriously misleading to discuss issues in terms of possible connections 
between ‘the financial and real sectors of the economy’, to use a phrase that appears occasionally in the literature 
on monetary policy. The phrase is misleading because it fails to recognise that the financial sector is a real 
sector.”       
2 Quoted in Friedman 1969.   3 
The paper is divided into three parts. In the first section, the asymmetric information (AI) 
approach is presented, and, in the second, the Keynes-Schumpeter approach is described; in 
the conclusion, the implications deriving from these two different analysis perspectives of 




1. The asymmetric information approach 
 
This approach abandons the hypothesis of perfect markets on which the neoclassical 
theorems on the irrelevance of money and the financial variables were founded. The capital 
market is significantly different in one respect from the other markets in which a 
simultaneous exchange between goods and money takes place; in the capital market, a given 
amount of money is exchanged for the promise of receiving a greater amount of money in the 
future. The temporal dimension of the credit contract leads the creditors to gather information 
in order to evaluate the ability of debtors to pay back the loan. Two types of situations can be 
distinguished: a) in the first, characterised by symmetric information, debitor and creditor 
have the same access to all the information available, b) in the second, characterised by 
asymmetric information, the creditors do not have all the information available to the debtors. 
The presence of information asymmetrics in the capital market has two important 
consequences: a) in the first place, it eliminates the assumption of perfect substitutability 
between the different sources of firm financing. In the presence of asymmetric information, 
the Modigliani – Miller theory is no longer valid and the firms are not indifferent as regards 
the choice of the source of financing. The problem of the choice of the optimal financial 
structure, that is of the financial structure that allows the information costs to be minimized, 
becomes important; b) secondly, it provides a justification for the presence of financial 
intermediaries, and, in particular, of the banks, who specialise in information gathering.  
According to the supporters of the AI approach, these two conclusions apply in particular 
to the small and medium firms, as there is less information available about them; this means 
that one should expect a significant difference between the financial structure of the small and 
medium firms with respect to that of the big firms; a difference that would reflect the 
different degree of asymmetric information. In recent years many empiricial studies have 
been published that set out to verify the soundness of the AI approach and the fact that the  
small and medium firms have a peculiar financial structure. In the next section the two main 
theoretical conclusions of the AI approach are illustrated and the most important results of the 




1.1 Asymmetric information, Modigliani-Miller theorem and financial intermediaries.  
 
The first result obtained by the AI approach is to show that the presence of AI renders the 
Modigliani-Miller theorem inapplicable. If the potential creditors have less information than 
the entrepreneur who plans to carry out a new investment project, then it is not indifferent for 
the firm to choose among self-financing, debt or a new share issue.  
In the presence of asymmetric information the firms have to address the  problem of 
choosing the optimal financial structure,  i.e. the financial structure that makes it possible to 
minimize the information costs. The most well-known response is the ‘pecking order   4 
theory’,
3 whose conclusions can be summarised in the following points: a) in the presence of 
asymmetric information, firms prefer self-financing over external financing; b) if self-
financing proves insufficient to fund the planned investment, firms prefer to get into debt 
rather than to issue new equity. These conclusions are obtained by applying to the capital 
market the results of the work of Akerlof (1970). In Akerlof’s model the potential used car 
buyers are not able to recognise the quality of the cars; in the case of the capital market, it is 
assumed that the potential financiers know only the expected return of the investment project 
that a single firm intends to carry out, while the single firm knows the actual return of its 
project.  If it is assumed that there are many firms planning to carry out investment projects, 
and that every project has the same rate of return, it can be shown that the issue of new shares 
would be a very costly form of financing for the best firms. They would, in fact, have to issue 
shares on the same conditions as other firms so the potential share subscribers would not be 
able to distinguish between the strong and weak investment projects. The best firms would 
thus prefer to finance themselves through debt; in this situation, the worst firms have to 
follow the example of the best ones if they want to avoid being identified by the market. 
 The supporters of the AI approach recognise that the ‘pecking order  theory’ is not 
generally valid; indeed, there are situations of asymmetric information in which firms may 
not be able to finance themselves through debt and are therefore forced to issue shares. This 
happens in particular when there is a potential conflict of interest between the creditors and 
the entrepreneur, who, once he has obtained the financing, could decide to carry out a riskier 
project than the one for which he obtained the financing, thus passing the risk onto the 
creditors.
4 The first conclusion that can be drawn is that the choice of the financial structure 
depends on the type of asymmetric information which characterises the firm. 
The second result obtained from using the asymmetric information approach is that it 
provides a convincing theory of financial intermediaries according to which their function is 
to reduce the costs associated with asymmetric information.  The theory which characterises 
the AI approach is elaborated by starting from the observation that the presence of debtors 
and creditors is the necessary premise to justify the presence of financial intermediaries. The 
recourse to financial intermediaries entails a cost for the creditors and debtors; for this reason, 
the theory should explain what are the services provided by the financial intermediaries which 
compensate for the costs of intermediation.
5 The presence of asymmetric information allows 
us to formulate a  good answer: the services offered by the intermediaries is to gather 
information. Intermediaries play the same role in the credit market as the merchants play in 
Akerlof’s used car market. Akerlof emphasized that the presence of asymmetric information 
stimulates the creation of agents whose purpose is to reduce the information costs; he 
considered, in particular, the activity of merchants that specialise in evaluating the quality of 
the goods exchanged.
6 The role played by financial intermediaries can be illustrated using the 
distinction between inside debt and outside debt: 
                                                 
3 See: Myers 1984; 2001; Myers and Mayluf 1984. 
4 See for example: Gompers 1995; Berger and Udell 1998; Myers 2001; Carpenter and Petersen 2002.  
5 “… it is useful to observe that, in principle, intermediate finance has one disadvantage: the chain of 
transactions between the firm and the final investor is longer, and ceteris paribus, an increase in the length of the 
chain of transactions may be taken  to entail an increase in transactions costs. Any proposition that intermediated 
finance is more advantageous than direct finance must therefore be based on a view that the presumed gains 
from intermediation are more than enough to compensate for the increased transactions costs.” Hellwig 1991, p. 
42. 
6 “In our picture the important skill of the merchant is identifying the quality of merchandise: those who can 
identify used cars in our example and can guarantee the quality may profit by as much as the difference between 
type two traders’ buying price and type one traders’ selling price. These people are merchants.” Akerlof 1970, p. 
117.”Akerlof 1970, p. 117.    5 
 
“ Inside debt is defined as a contract where the debtholder gets access to information from an 
organization’s decision process not otherwise publicly available… Bank loans are inside debt, as 
are the other types of debt commonly classified as private placements. In contrast, outside debt is 
defined as publicly traded debt where the debtholder relies on publicly available information 
generated by the organization or by information purchased by the organization (for example, 
independent audits and bond ratings)”
7 
 
The characteristic of intermediaries is to provide finance through inside debt contracts 
stipulated on the basis of information not publicly available, which is obtained by virtue of 
the close relation with the debtors. The intermediaries’ activities typically take place inside 
the private debt and equity markets in which the financing is provided by means of complex 
contracts whose characteristics are defined on the basis of information not publicly available.  
The asymmetric information approach emphasizes that the recourse to financing from 
financial intermediaries regards especially the small and medium firms which, due to their 
informational opacity, and the high fixed costs a ssociated with public share and bond 
offerings, are not able to finance themselves by using public debt and equity markets.
8 The 
different degree of asymmetric information which distinguishes the small and medium firms 
with respect to the big companies therefore constitutes the principal explanation of the 
differences which are found between the financial structures of these two groups of 
companies. Such differences can be summarised in two points: a) the different importance of 
the self-financing channel: the small and medium firms are characterised by a high proportion 
of self-funding; b) the different share of financing obtained through the private markets: the 
external financing of small and medium firms come from private markets. 
9   
The AI approach provides important elements that regard: i) the relationship that is 
created between the intermediaries and the firms; ii) the nature of the information collected 
by the financial intermediaries iii) the characteristics of the financial intermediaries. Many 
studies highlight the importance of the creation of a lasting relationship over time, which can 
lead to the application of more advantageous financing conditions for the firms. As Petersen e 
Rajan (1994, p. 5) observe: 
 
“… through close and continued interaction, a firm may provide a lender with sufficient 
information about, and a voice in,  the firm’s affairs so as to lower the cost and increase the 
availability of credit. We term this interaction a relationship.”
10 
 
The possibility of creating a close relationship between the intermediaries and the firms 
implies a physical proximity between these agents. Lasting relations are thus a characteristic 
                                                 
7 Fama 1985, p. 277. 
8 As Berger and Udell assert (1998, p. 616):“Perhaps the most important characteristic defining small business 
finance is informational opacity. Unlike large firms, small firms do not enter into contracts that are publicly 
visible or widely reported in the press-contracts with their labour force, their suppliers, and their costomers are 
generally kept private. In addition, small business do not issue traded securities that are continuously priced in 
public markets… As a result, small firms often cannot credibly convey their quality… The private equity and 
debt markets … offer specialized mechanism to address these difficulties… The financial intermediaries that 
operate in these markets actively screen, contract with, and monitor the small business… it can be argued that 
the modern theory of financial intermediation… is mostly a theory that applies to the provision of intermediated 
finance in private markets to small, informatically opaque firms.” 
9As Berger and Udell state (1998, p. 660): “Unlike large firms, small business typically have a substantial 
amount of their funding provided by insiders – the entrepreneur, other members of the start-up team, family, and 
friends. In addition, small businesses generally receive their external funding in private equity and debt markets, 
rather than public markets.” See also: Hughes and Storey 1994; Cantillo and Wright 2000. 
10 See also: Berger and Udell 1995; 2002; Meyer 1998; Cole 1998; Gorton and Winton 2002.     6 
element of the relationship between small and medium firms and local banks, which collect 
information not only because of  their relation with the debtor firm, but also on account of 
their relations with the other components of the local economy such as clients or suppliers of 
the debtor firm.
11 A lasting relationship allows the intermediary to extend the financing over 
time, and to condition future financing on the basis of the information available about the 
behaviour of the firm and the evolution of the investment project.
12  
The information gathered by the financial intermediaries through lasting relationships 
with the firms is defined as ‘soft information’.
13 This information differs from ‘hard 
information’ relating to financial statements, payments to suppliers, proceeds taken in; this 
type of information is easy to quantity, verify and to pass on.  
The asymmetric information approach distinguishes between two types of intermediaries: 
the bank intermediaries and the non-bank intermediaries.
14 The most important example of 
non-bank financial intermediaries are venture capitalists.
15 The venture capitalists finance the 
firms by underwriting shares, counting more on the possible gain in capital account to be 
obtained by the sale of shares rather than on the dividends.  Banks and venture capitalists 
finance firms that have different characteristics; we can identify various factors that render 
bank financing difficult for some firms. In the first place, we can cite the problems of moral 
hazard which arise when there is a potential conflict of interest between the firm and the 
debtor; these problems make the access to bank credit difficult for those firms that do not 
possess businesses that can be given as collateral to the banks.
16 Moreover, bank credit does 
not constitute a very suitable instrument for financing the particularly risky investment 
projects which, if successful, could yield high returns. Indeed, in these cases, the banks would 
have to apply excessively high interest rates, above the limits that are set by law against 
usury, and which, if they could be applied, would constitute an intolerable burden for firms.
17  
These considerations lead us to conclude that the ideal clients of venture capitalists are the 
firms that intend to carry out high return risky projects, but which do not have sufficient 
collateral to offer the banks. They are essentially small and medium sized firms that operate 
in the most innovative sectors.
18  
                                                 
11 See: Berger and Udell 2002. 
12Stulz (2001, p. 153) notes that: “The solution to finance the entrepreneur’s project generally involves staged 
financing obtained from financial intermediaries such as banks, banks substitutes, and possibly venture 
capitalists. Banks effectively provide staged financing. They do so in the form of loans that they renew and 
expand as the entrepreneur makes his case for financing more compelling.” See also: Gompers 1995; 
Bergemann and Hege 1998; Fenn and Liang 1998; Mason and Harrison 2001. 
13 “Relationship information is often ‘soft’ data, such as the information about the character and reliability of 
firm’s owner, and may be difficult to quantify, verify and communicate…”Berger and Udell 2002, p. 32; see 
also: Petersen and Rajan 2002. 
14 The characteristics of bank intermediaries are defined by Gorton and Winton (2002, p. 2) thus: “By bank like 
financial intermediaries we mean firms with the following characteristics: 1) they borrow from one group of 
agents and lend to another group of agents; 2) the borrowing and lending groups are large, suggesting 
diversification on each side of the balance sheet; 3) the claims issued to borrowers and to lenders have different 
state contingent payoffs.” 
15 “Venture capitalists perform the quintessential functions of financial intermediaries, taking funds from a group 
of investors and redeploying those funds by investing in  informationally opaque issuers. In addition to 
screening, contracting, and monitoring, venture capitalists also determine the time and form of investment 
exit.”Berger and Udell 1998, p. 632. 
16 “Collateral and guarantees are powerful tools that allow financial institutions to offer credit on favourable 
terms to small businesses whose informational opacity might otherwise result in either credit rationing or the 
extension of credit only on unfavourable terms.” Berger and Udell 1998, p. 639.  
17 See: Gompers 1995, Carpenter e Petersen 2002. 
18 See: Gompers 1995; Fenn and Liang 2000; Allen and Gale 1999; Jeng and Wells 2000; Freel 2000; Carpenter 
and Petersen 2002.    7 
Numerous empirical studies set out to verify the soundness of the AI approach’s 
conclusions concerning the characteristics of the financial structure of the small and medium 
firms. The results regarding the financial structure of the small and medium firms concern 
three points: i) the importance of self-financing and the recourse to inside debt contracts; ii) 
the importance of financing granted on the basis of lasting relationships iii) the recourse on 
the part of the small and medium firms to the private equity market.  
Many studies confirm the recourse of the small and medium firms to self-financing and to 
inside debt contracts. The data collected by Berger and Udell on the capital structure of the 
small American firms in 1993 shows that, of the total capital, the proportion made up by 
equity is 49.63%, and by debt, 50.37%. The owner-entrepreneur holds 31.33% of this 49.63% 
quota while other agents consisting of other members of the family and friends own 12.86% 
of it; the residual amount of 6.44% is composed of shares owned by angels and by venture 
capitalists. As far as the debt is concerned, the most important quotas are comprised of 
financing obtained from financial institutions, corresponding to 26.66% of the total capital, 
and from commercial credit, which is equal to 15.78%. Similar statistics are found in other 
countries.
19      
Petersen and Rajan (1994) have analysed the consequences of the presence of a lasting 
relationship between banks and firms on the financing conditions imposed, and in particular 
on the interest level applied and on the availability of credit. Their analysis, based on data 
regarding small American firms, shows that the duration of the relationship between the bank 
and the firm seems to have a slight effect on the interest rate and a significant impact on the 
availability of credit.
20  These results have been confirmed by other studies;
21 the results of 
empirical research regarding Italy are particularly important, given the strong presence of 
small and medium firms that often work within districts, i.e. delimited geographical areas 
inside which are found numerous firms involved in the various production phases which lead 
to the manufacture of a homogenous good. Local banks, i.e. banks that were created and grew 
within the area, often operate in the districts. The analysis of the Italian experience confirms 
the influence of the lasting relationships on the firms’ financing conditions.
22  
In a recent work, Petersen e Rajan (2002) analysed the consequences of the processes of 
merger and concentration experienced by the U.S. banking sector on the small firms’ 
financing conditions. They highlight two, apparently contradictory, phenomenon. On the one 
hand, they observe, in tandem with  the process of mergers and concentration, that the 
physical distance separating small firms and creditor banks grew substantially in the period 
from 1973 and 1993; on the other hand, they note that this greater distance did not lead to 
greater difficulties in financing for the small firms. This combination of apparently 
contradictory phenomena is due, according to Petersen e Rajan, to the effects of the 
information technology revolution allowing banks to gather a larger quantity of information 
despite the greater distance from the firms. They stress that the information collected by the 
banks through information technology is different from that collected through the direct 
contact typical of banks and firms which are in close physical proximity.
23    
                                                 
19 See: Giudici e Paleari 2000; Lopez-Garcia and Aybar-Arias 2000; Manigart and Stuyf 1997; Hughes and 
Storey 1994; Cantillo and Wright 2000. 
20 Petersen and Rajan (1994) consider as an indicator of the availability of credit the amount of credit that firms 
obtain from the most costly source; firms that have unlimited access to bank credit do not resort to more 
expensive forms of financing. 
21 See: Cole 1998. 
22 See: Finaldi Russo and Rossi (1999); Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2002); Alessandrini and Zazzaro (2001); 
Angelini, Di Salvo and Ferro (1998). 
23“Soft information is, by definition, hard to put down on paper or store electronically… Instead, we believe 
more hard information about the borrower, such as whether he is current on his trade credit payment and to   8 
Finally, as regards the third point, we note that many studies confirm that it is especially 
the firms involved in the high-tech sector that turn to the private equity market. Carpenter and 
Rajan (2002) analyse the data of 2.400 small and medium American firms involved in the 
high-tech sector and find that recourse to debt is much lower. Meyers (2001) observes, in 
connection with the U.S. experience, that the firms who most use share issues are: “… the 
smaller, riskier and more rapidly growing firms”.
24 Research on other countries also indicates 
the importance of the role of venture capital; it is shown how the aversion of the owner – 
manager to the issue of new shares can be overcome when, as in the case of the venture 
capitalist, the agent underwriting the new shares is able to offer skills which are 
complementary to those of the owner-manager.
25  These considerations lead different authors 







2. The Keynes-Schumpeter approach 
 
It is possible to specify a theoretical approach which is alternative to the one based on the 
presence of asymmetric information, an approach that can be defined on the basis of the 
theories of both Keynes and Schumpeter.  We can identify a common theory of credit and of 
financial institutions which is profoundly different from the one which characterises the 
asymmetric information approach. The characteristics of this approach can be presented by 
elaborating three points; i) the nature of the credit market; ii) the role of the banks; iii) the 
monetary nature of the interest rate.  
 
 
2.1 The nature of the credit market  
 
Both Keynes and Schumpeter observe that the credit market becomes particularly 
important as the use of fiat money spreads; the credit market is the instrument through which 
fiat money is made available to operators who plan to carry out a spending decision. They 
both maintain that the spread of fiat money profoundly changed the characteristics of the 
economic system. 
Keynes (1933a) underlines this point by distinguishing between a real exchange economy 
and a monetary economy.  He uses the first term to denote an economy in which money is just 
an instrument that makes it possible to reduce the costs of the exchange; the use of money 
does not change the structure of the economic system with respect to a barter economy. With 
                                                                                                                                                  
whom he has applied for credit, is now available even to lenders at a distance. As a result, even if lenders do not 
have the rich soft information they obtained from infrequent, but close, contact with the borrower, they now 
have far more timely hard information about their creditworthiness. This enable them to lend at a distance 
knowing they can intervene quickly and foreclose or refuse loan renewal if conditions deteriorate. Thus, new 
technology permits more, and different, information to be gathered, stored, and distributed. It changes the nature 
of lending… Petersen and Rajan 2002, p. 2535. 
24 “Venture capital has been the driving force behind some of the most vibrant sectors of the US economy over 
the past two decades. Venture capitalists were instrumental in fostering the tremendous growth such as 
Microsoft, Compaq, Oracle and Sun Microsystems…” Jeng and Wells 2000. See also: Berger and Udell (2002); 
Frank and Goyal (2003). 
25 See for instance: Giudici and Paleari 2000; Manicart and Struyf 1997; Mason and Harrison 2001. 
26 See: Carpernter and Petersen (2000); Mason and Harrison (2001).   9 
the term monetary economy,  Keynes refers to an economy in which the presence of fiat 
money radically changes the nature of the exchanges and the law of production. The spread of 
fiat money transforms an exchange economy characterised by full employment into a 
production economy in which the level of income and production are bound to fluctuate. The 
condition that guarantees full employment in a world where commodity money is used, is the 
fact that any individual can produce money in the same way in which he produces any other 
good. In fact, Keynes (1993b) observes that in a gold standard system, fluctuations in the 
effective demand do not create permanent unemployment as the unemployed workers can set 
about producing the money-good, that is, gold.
27 When fiat money is used this is no longer 
possible: fiat money is not a good that can be produced by unemployed workers. The 
production of fiat money is the prerogative of particular agents; Keynes concentrates the 
attention on the banks and on bank money. 
Using fiat money as bank money changes the nature of the exchanges with respect to a 
barter economy: when bank money is used, it is not necessary to own goods to buy other 
goods, but it is necessary to have money, and to obtain money it is necessary to satisfy the 
criteria applied by the banks for granting loans. The credit market is the instrument through 
which banks distribute money; to describe this market it is necessary to explain who are the 
agents that demand credit. Keynes deals with the credit market in some works published 
between 1937 and 1939 to reply to criticism of General Theory, and, in particular, to Ohlin’s 
criticism of his interest rate theory 
Ohlin compares with the Keynesian interest rate theory a new version of the loanable 
funds theory, according to which the interest rate is determined by the credit demand which 
depends on ex-ante investments, i.e. those planned by the firms, and by the supply of credit 
which instead depends on ex-ante savings. Keynes (1937) considers the concept of ex-ante 
investment important because it shows that the firms, to carry out their spending decisions, 
must obtain liquidity and, thus, that a lack of liquidity can impede the f irms’ investment 
decisions. At the same time, Keynes criticises Ohlin, noting that the supply of liquidity does 
not depend on the saving decisions, but on the banks’ decisions. In fact, Keynes  observes that 
the firms that plan the investments need liquidity that cannot be provided by ex-ante savers.
28 
Savings are a consequence of the investment decisions carried out by the firms thanks to the 
money created by banks.
29 
From Keynes’s analysis there emerges a theory of credit which is completely different to 
the one which characterises the asymmetric information approach. According to the latter, the 
object of the credit is resources which have been saved; the existence of savers and investors 
is a necessary condition for a credit market, while the presence of banks is a consequence of 
the existence of asymmetric information. The use of fiat money has no effect on the nature of 
the credit market; both in the case in which commodity money is used and in the case in 
                                                 
27 “In actual fact under a gold standard gold can be produced, and in a slump there will be some diversion of 
employment towards gold mining. If, indeed, it were easily practicable to divert output towards gold on a 
sufficient scale for the value of the increased current output of gold to make  good the deficiency in expenditure 
in other forms of current output, unemployment could not occur; except in the transitional period before the 
turn-over to increased gold-production could be completed.” (J.M.Keynes 1993b, pp. 85-86).  
 
28 “… The ex-ante saver has no cash, but it is cash which the ex-ante investor requires. … Surely nothing is 
more certain than that the credit or ‘finance’ required by ex-ante investment is not mainly supplied by ex-ante 
saving .” (J.M.Keynes 1937c, p. 664-5). 
29 “Increased investment will always be accompanied by increased saving, but it can never be preceded by it. 
Dishoarding and credit expansion provides not an alternative to increased saving, but a necessary preparation for 
it. It is the parent, not the twin, of increased saving.” ( J.M.Keynes 1939, p. 572). For a more detailed analysis 
see: Bertocco 2002.   10 
which fiat money is used, the object of the credit is the resources set aside by savers. Keynes 
instead maintains that: a) the object of credit is the money created by the banks and not by 
saving; b) the credit market is based on the relationship between banks and firms and not on 
the saver-investor relation. 
The same conception of the credit market which marks Keynes’s thinking emerges from 
the work of Schumpeter. Like Keynes, Schumpeter also observes that the spread of bank 
money profoundly changed the structure of the economic system. To highlight this change, 
Schumpeter (1912) distinguishes between a pure exchange economy and a   capitalist 
economy. A pure exchange economy is one  based on private property, on the division of 
labour and on free competition; an economy that always tends to replicate itself 
unchangingly, or that is in any case subject to very gradual changes triggered by extra-social 
factors like natural conditions, or by extra-economic social factors like wars, or by  consumer 
tastes; it is an economy in which the production decisions are influenced by saver preferences 
and in which the principle of consumer sovereignty holds. In a pure exchange economy, 
money is just an instrument that reduces the transaction costs; its presence does not alter the 
structure of the economic system. 
A capitalist economy, on the other hand, is an economy characterised by a continuous 
process of change triggered by internal factors. The fundamental internal factor of change 
regards the sphere of production and it is the innovations which consist in the introduction of 
a new good, or of a new method of production, or from the opening of a new market. The 
availability of credit constitutes the necessary condition for the realization of the innovations. 
Schumpeter emphasizes that within a capitalist economy three elements can be identified 
which make the role of credit essential in the development process: 1) private ownership of 
the factors of production; 2) the fact that innovations are carried out especially by new men, 
who do not own the factors of production;
30   3) the full employment of productive 
resources.
31   In order for the innovations to be carried out, these new men must be able to 
control the factors of production that are in the hands of the existing firms; credit is the 
instrument that enables entrepreneurs-innovators to use the existing productive resources in 
order to carry out innovations 
32  
Schumpeter stresses that the object of credit is not the resources saved, but the purchasing 
power created by the banks that allows the entrepreneur-innovator to divert the means of 
production from the traditional uses to which it would be put by the existing firms. He 
maintains that the fundamental factor determining the process of development that 
                                                 
30 “… it is not essential… that the new combinations should be carried out by the same people who control the 
productive or commercial process which is to be displaced by the new. On the contrary, new combinations are, 
as a rule, embodied, as it were, in new firms which generally do not arise out of the old ones but start producing 
beside them   … in general, it is not the owner of stage-coaches who builds railways.” Schumpeter 1912, p 66.    
31 “…whenever we are concerned with fundamental principles, we must never assume that the carrying out of 
new combinations takes place by employing means of production which happen to be unused. In practical life, 
this is very often the case. There are always unemployed workmen, unsold row materials, unused productive 
capacity, and so fort. … but great unemployment is only the consequence of non-economic events –as for 
example the World War - or precisely of the development which we are investigating.  In neither of the two 
cases its existence play a fundamental role in the explanation, and it cannot occur in a well balanced circular 
flow from which we start.” Schumpeter 1912, p. 67.   
32Schumpeter (1912, p. 71) observes that the problem with innovation is in:“… detaching productive means 
(already employed somewhere) from the circular flow and allotting them to new combinations. This is done by 
credit, by means of which one who wishes to carry out new combinations outbids the producers in the circular 
flow in the market for the required means of production.”    11 
characterises a capitalist economy is not saving, but the different use of the existing 
productive resources made possible through credit.
33 
In a capitalist economy the nature of credit is very different from in a pure exchange 
economy. The banks issue credit instruments denominated in legal tender, which have the 
same function as money
34 Schumpeter criticises the traditional view of the credit market 
according to which the supply of credit depends on the saving decisions and the banks are 
only intermediaries that collect the liquidity of savers. The banks are not intermediaries, but 
they create means of payment that carry out the same functions as legal tender.
35 The main 
players in the credit market, therefore, are not the savers and the firms, but banks and firms: 
 
“The kernel of the matter lies in the credit requirements of new enterprises. … only one 
fundamental thing happens on the money market, to which everything else is accessory: on the 
demand side appear entrepreneurs and on the supply side producers of and dealers in purchasing 
power, viz. bankers, both with their staffs of agents and middlemen.”
36 
 
The credit market is not therefore a simple mirror image of the real economy as the 
neoclassical theory contends, but instead it represents an essential factor in the development 
process which characterises a capitalist economy with respect to an exchange economy.
37 
Keynes and  Schumpeter elaborate their analysis of the credit market in different contexts. 
For Keynes, the use of fiat money and its diffusion through the credit market become the 
fundamental elements of a monetary economy that does not possess automatic mechanisms 
capable of guaranteeing full employment. In contrast, Schumpeter criticises the static 
framework of  The General Theory which overlooks the process of continuous change that 
marks a capitalist economy and neglects the effects of investment decisions on the productive 
capacity of the economic system.
38  
These important differences of perspectives do not prevent us from highlighting the 
benefits of a synthesis between these two great economists.
39 This synthesis could be based 
on two points. The first one concerns the credit theory. We can identify a theory of credit that 
unites Keynes and Schumpeter and that is based on two points: a) for both, the object of the 
credit is not saving but the money created by banks; b) for both, the credit market is based on 
the relation between banks and firms rather than on the relation between savers and firms. 
The second point is in recognising the usefulness of extending Keynes’s analysis beyond the 
short term; this implies the need to recognise the influence of investment decisions on the 
                                                 
33 “That rudiment of a pure economic theory of development which is implied in the traditional doctrine of the 
formation of capital always refers merely to saving and to the investment of the small yearly increase 
attributable to it. In this it asserts nothing false, but entirely overlooks much more essential things. The slow and 
continuous increase  in time of the national supply  of productive means and of savings is obviously an 
important factor in explaining the course of  economic history through the centuries, but it is completely 
overshadowed by the fact that development consists primarily in employing existing resources in a different 
way, in doing new things with them, irrespective of whether those resources increase or not.  … Different 
methods of employment, and not saving and increases in the available quantity of labor, have changed the face 
of the economic world in the last fifty years.” Schumpeter 1912, p. 68. 
34 “Means of payments are created in the economic system which are, in the external form, it is true, represented 
as mere claims to money, but which differ essentially from claims to other goods in that they perform exactly the 
same service – at least temporarily- as the good in question itself, so that they may under certain circumstances 
take its place.” Schumpeter 1912, p. 97. 
35Schumpeter 1954, p. 1113. 
36 Schumpeter 1912, p. 125.  
37 Schumpeter 1939 p. 356. 
38 Schumpeter 1937, p. 356 (Messori) 
39 O n the opportuneness of a synthesis between the views of Keynes and Schumpeter see: Minsky 1986; 
Morishima 1992.   12 
productive capacity of the economic system. This limit of Keynes’s analysis is recognised by 
economists such as Kalecki, Kaldor and Hicks.  
A theoretical framework that summarises the thinking of these two renowned economists 
should, on the one hand, include the Keynesian theory of income determination  and, on the 
other, highlight the importance of investment decisions in the development process that 
characterises the capitalist economy. In this way, the dual role of investment decisions is 
emphasized: component of autonomous demand and element through which the innovations 
that influence the evolution of the economy are made. In this scheme,  innovations are 
introduced via investment decisions, that is, through the demand for new capital goods, rather 
than by a new use of the existing productive resources on the part of the new entrepreneurs; 
the role of credit therefore consists in ensuring that means of payment flows to the firms that 
intend to make investments.  
The opportuneness of expanding the Keynesian theory by giving prominence to the 
implications of the investment decisions for the evolution of the economic system is justified 
by the importance that the phenomenon of uncertainty assumes in Keynes’s analysis. Keynes 
(1937a) states that the fundamental difference between his own theory and the classical one is 
the hypothesis introduced about the way the expectations regarding future results of economic 
decisions are specified. The  classical theory assumes that it is possible to objectively 
represent these results by using tools of financial mathematics and the probability theory. In 
contrast, Keynes assumes that there are no objective methods that allow the future results of 
investment decisions to be represented; these decisions are taken in conditions of uncertainty. 
We can observe that the phenomenon of uncertainty is linked to the continuous evolution of 
the economic system which prevents us from considering the past and the present as a reliable 
guide to predict the future consequences of investment decisions. Uncertainty is thus the 
fundamental characteristic of a continuously evolving economy which does not replicate itself 
in the same way; an economy in which investment decisions do not entail a mere increase in 
the production capacity, but imply a structural modification of the production system, the 
results of which cannot be objectively predicted. Highlighting the aspect of uncertainty 
therefore means recognising the importance of the change. Keynes stresses that the 
phenomenon of uncertainty acquires particular significance in an economic system where 
investment decisions are of considerable importance.
40  It can furthermore be observed that 
when Schumpeter describes the behaviour of the innovator-entrepreneur, the views he 
expresses are similar to those of Keynes on the impossibility of predicting the effects of 
innovations on the basis of observations on the past.
41  Schumpeter (1912, pp. 84-85) notes 
that when the entrepreneur must evaluate the future results of an innovation: 
                                                 
40 “The whole object of the accumulation of wealth is to produce results, or potential results, at a comparatively 
distant, and sometimes at an  indefinitely  distant, date. Thus the  fact that our knowledge of the future is 
fluctuating, vague and uncertain, renders wealth a peculiarly unsuitable subject for the methods of the classical 
economic theory. This theory might work very well in a world in which economic goods were necessarily 
consumed within a short interval of their being produced. But it requires, I suggest, considerable amendment if it 
is to be applied to a world in which the accumulation of wealth for an indefinitely postponed future is an 
important factor; and the greater the proportionate part played by such wealth accumulation the more essential 
does such amendment become.” Keynes 1937a, p. 113. 
41 “While in the accustomed circular flow every individual can act promptly and rationally because he is sure of 
his ground and is supported by the conduct, as adjusted to this circular flow, of all other individuals, who in turn 
expect the accustomed activity from him, he cannot simply do this when he is confronted by a new task. … 
While he swims with the stream in the circular flow which is familiar to him, he swims against the stream if he  
wishes to change its channel. What was formerly  a help becomes a hindrance. What was a familiar datum 
becomes  an unknown.  … The assumption that conduct is  prompt and rational is in all cases a fiction. But   it 
proves to be sufficiently near to reality, if things have time to hammer logic unto men.  … outside of these limits   13 
 
“…the individual is without those data for his decisions and those rules of conduct which are 
very accurately known to him within them. Of course he must still foresee and estimate on the 
basis of his experience. But many things must remain uncertain, still others are only ascertainable  
within wide limits, some can perhaps only be ‘guessed’. In particular this is true of those data 
which the individual strives to alter and those which he wants to create. … Carrying out a new 
plan and acting according to a customary one are things as different as making a road and walking 
along it. … As military action must be taken in a given strategic position even if all the data 
potentially procurable are not available, so also in economic life action must be taken without 
working out all the details of what is to be done. Here the success of everything depends upon 
intuition, the capacity of seeing things in a way which afterwards proves to be true, even though  it 
cannot be established at the moment , and of grasping the essential fact, discarding the unessential, 
even though one can give no account of the principles by which this is done.” 
 
It is precisely the peculiarity of the behaviour determining the innovations that leads 
Schumpeter to assert that innovations must be made by new people, capable of imagining a 
different reality from the one in which they live, and of countering the forces which are 
hostile to the innovation. The singularity of these people manifests itself in their motivations 





2.2 The role of banks 
 
The analysis of the phenomenon of credit that emerges from the approaches of Keynes 
and Schumpeter leads to a different definition of the role of banks than is obtained following 
the asymmetric information approach. As has been recalled, according to this approach, the 
existence of banks is justified by the presence of asymmetric information which hinders the 
direct financing of firms by savers. In a world without friction, savers directly finance the 
firms, and the interest rate is the instrument that allows the most profitable investments to be 
selected and to assure an efficient use of resources.
43  The function of banks is to gather 
information, in this way eliminating the problems connected  with the presence of aymmetric 
information. The banks’ activities permit the real world, characterised by imperfections, to 
obtain those optimal results that characterise an economy without imperfections in which the 
mechanism of the interest rate ensures the efficient allocation of the savings. This conclusion 
is based on the conviction that the credit market works like Akerlof’s used car market. In 
other words, it is based on the conviction that information exists which permits the quality of 
an investment project to be objectively assessed in the same way in which the quality of a 
used car is evaluated. In the works in which the AI approach is presented, it is frequently 
assumed: a) that the future returns of a given investment project can be represented by a 
probability distribution characterised by a given forecasted return and by a given degree of 
                                                                                                                                                  
our fiction loses its closeness to reality. To cling to it there also, as the traditional theory does, is to hide an 
essential thing…”Schumpeter 1912, pp. 79-80. 
42 Schumpeter (1912, p. 93) describes thus the motives which drive the behaviour of the entrepreneur-
innovator:“First of all, there is the dream and the will to found a private kingdom … Then there is the will to 
conquer: the impulse to fight, to prove oneself superior to others, to succeed for the sake, not of the fruits of 
success, but of success itself. … finally there is the joy of creating, of getting things done, or simply of 
exercising one’s energy and ingenuity.” 
43 See for example: Wurgler 2000; Gorton and Winton 2002; Stulz 2001.   14 
risk; b) that if all the agents had the same information, they would know the ‘true’ return 
probability distribution of that project.
44  
Instead, Keynes and Schumpeter consider the presence of banks, of bank money and the 
credit market as essential elements of an economic system which is completely different from 
a real-exchange economy, to which Keynes refers, or to the pure exchange economy that 
Schumpeter talks about. Banks and credit are the fundamental elements of an economic 
system in which there are no mechanisms guaranteeing that full employment is automatically 
reached, of an economy in continuous evolution driven by the innovations made by virtue of 
the investment decisions taken in conditions of uncertainty. The credit market from this 
perspective is completely different from Akerlof’s used car market; it is one thing to assess 
the quality of used cars, quite another thing to evaluate the future returns of an investment 
project for the manufacture of a new type of car. In the presence of uncertainty there are no 
objective criteria that allow the future returns of investment projects to be evaluated; even the 
banks act in conditions of uncertainty. They evaluate the applications for financing presented 
by firms on the basis of subjective, discretionary criteria. This means that even if they had at 
their disposal the same information that the firms have, assuming that it is possible to list the 
information necessary to evaluate the future returns of an investment project in the same way 
in which the information necessary to assess the quality of a used car can be listed, the banks 
could have a different way to evaluate the return prospects of a given project than an 
entrepeneur-innovator. They could thus decide to ration the credit to certain entrepreneurs not 
because of any information they have, but because they believe that the entrepreneur 
elaborated overly optimistic forecasts.
45 Therefore, the banks share with the entrepreneurs- 
innovators the responsibility of deciding which investments are carried out; by their decisions 
they influence the development of the economic system.
46 
This function of the banks is particularly present in the work of Schumpeter, who 
highlights the social role of the banks, noting that they have the same function as the central 
planning authority in a socialist economy. In a socialist economy the means of production are 
publicly owned and so it is the planning authority that decides how to use the available 
productive factors. When such authority decides to produce a new good, it orders a certain 
quantity of productive factors from a given sector to be collected and used in the new activity. 
In a capitalist economy in which the means of production are privately owned the role of the 
planning authority is carried out by the banks which offer the entrepreneur innovators the 
purchasing power enabling them to use the productive factors, diverting them away from the 
uses to which they were previously destined.
47 
The social role of banks is defined by Schumpeter by giving prominence to three 
important aspects of their action. In the first place, Schumpeter emphasizes that the banks do 
not act on behalf of any particular agent as they do not lend the resources that have been 
                                                 
44 See for instance: Stiglitz and Weiss 1981; Jaffe and Stiglitz 1990. For a more detailed analysis, refer to: 
Bertocco 2001. 
45 See: Tobin 1980; De Meza and Southey 1996; Wolfson 1996; De Meza 2002. 
46 This role of the banks does not emerge in the Keynesian macroeconomic models elaborated starting from the 
IS-LM model, in which prominence is given only to the money market. In those models the investment 
decisions depend only on expectations of entrepreneurs and the interest rate; these decisions are not influenced 
by the banks’ choices as the firms always have, at the market interest rate, the necessary liquidity to finance the 
desired investment. 
47“… suppose that our socialist community finds it convenient to rule that the executive submit every innovation 
it wishes to carry out to another body, which passes upon it and may grant or withhold assent In case it sanctions 
the plan, it countersigns and issues the orders to the factors to form the new combination. This is the function 
which in capitalist society is filled by banks which, in providing entrepreneurs with means to buy factors of 
production or their services, do something akin to issuing such orders.” Schumpeter 1912. p. 86   15 
given to them by specific agents; banks create purchasing power that enables the 
entrepreneur-innovator to divert away the existing productive resources from the use to which 
they were previously put. Schumpeter underlines that the granting of credit by the banks 
binds society in its entirety as this decision takes control of the means of production from the 
existing owners; by their decisions the banks alter the distribution of the ownership of the 
means of production.
48  The instrument which allows the ownership of the means of 
production to be transferred to the innovator entrepreneurs is the inflation triggered by the 
fact that the demand for means of production of the innovator-entrepreneurs is added to that 
of the already existing firms; this increase in the demand with respect to a constant supply of 
productive services causes an increase in the price of services which enables the innovator to 
divert resources from their current allocation.
49 With inflation it is possible to generate: 
 
“…a shift of purchasing power across individuals … a transfer of means of production in 
favour of those individuals to whom credit is granted via creation of new money… it is hence 
possible for new individuals and new programs, which would otherwise remain in the 
background, to emerge. In this way the obstacles created by private ownership to those who do not 
already own means of production are eliminated. In the banking system a central economic 
planning bureau is thus created, whose directions render the necessary means of production 
available to new individuals…. In the creation of this money (the bank money) lies the essence of 
modern credit . It is the specifically capitalist method of sustaining economic development. Unlike 




The second element which enables us to define the social role of banks can be understood 
when the consequences of their decisions are taken into account. When he emphasizes the 
role of innovations in the process of evolution of the economic system, Schumpeter describes 
a world in which it is not consumer decisions that influence production decisions, but rather it 
is the decisions of the innovators and thus of the banks that finance them, that alter consumer 
tastes.
51   
The third element which contributes to the definition of the banks’ social role is the fact 
that they are the agents that assume the risk of the innovation. The entrepreneur-innovator 
does not risk his own resources but he acquires the means of production thanks to the 
purchasing power created by the banks; it is the bank that assumes the risk of the innovation 
                                                 
48“Granting credit … operates as an order on the economic system to accommodate itself to the purpose of the 
entrepreneur, as an order on the goods which he needs: it means entrusting him with productive forces… this 
function constitutes the keystone of the modern credit structure.”  Schumpeter 1912, p. 107 
49 “If … credit means of payment, new purchasing power in our sense, are created and placed at the 
entrepreneur’s disposal, then he takes his place beside the previous producers and his purchasing power its place 
besides the total previously existing. Obviously this does not increase the quantity of productive services 
existing in the economic sysyem. Yet ‘new demand’ becomes possible in a very obvious sense. It causes a rise in 
the prices of productive services. From this ensues the ‘withdrawal of goods’  from their previous use…” 
Schumpeter 1912, pp. 108 
50 Schumpeter 1917, p.114 (2/173). Translation of the Italian version contained in: J.Schumpeter, Stato e 
Inflazione. Saggi di Politica economica, Boringhieri Torino, 1983.   
51 “… innovations in the economic system do not as a rule take place in such a way that first new wants arise 
spontaneously in consumers and then the productive apparatus swings round through their pressure. We do not 
deny the presence of this nexus. It is, however,  the producer who as a rule initiates economic change, and 
consumers are educated by him if necessary….Therefore, while it is permissible and even necessary to consider 
consumers’ wants as an independent and indeed the fundamental force in a theory of circular flow, we must take 
a different attitude as soon as we analyse change.”  Schumpeter 1912 p. 65.    16 
and, through it, the entire community, that accepts the redistribution of the ownership of the 
means of production, caused by the  banks’ decisions.
52   
Given the social significance of the decisions taken by the banks, Schumpeter specifies 
the features of the banker’s behaviour. In the first place, the banker must know how to assess 
the characteristics of the investment project to be carried out and the personality of the 
entrepreneur. Secondly, as the banks act on behalf of society and not of particular agents, they 







2.3 The monetary nature of the interest rate. 
 
The third important aspect of the Keynes-Schumpeter approach concerns the interest rate 
theory. They both hold that the interest rate is a monetary phenomenon and not real; it does 
not constitute the reward for having renounced consumption as the supply of credit does not 
coincide with the saving. Keynes and Schumpeter come to define the monetary nature of the 
interest rate by following different paths. Keynes emphasizes money’s stock of value 
function: money is a tool that allows wealth to be preserved over time. He observes that this 
role of money is particularly relevant in the presence of uncertainty, inasmuch as having 
money h elps to alleviate the anxiety affecting people who must act without having clear 
points of reference; the interest rate, which constitutes the return on alternative activities to 
money, can be considered as an indicator of the unease produced by uncertainty.
54 Keynes 
does not alter is theory even when, after the publication of The General Theory, he recognises 
the need to render explicit the issue of financing of the firms’ investments; as a matter of fact, 
as is well known, he considers the liquidity demand from the firms not as a demand for credit 
but as a further component of the demand for money.
55  
Schumpeter, on the other hand, defines the monetary nature of the interest rate by placing 
the credit market at the centre of his analysis. As the object of the credit is the liquidity 
created by the banks, the interest is the premium that the banks ask to those who wish to 
acquire purchasing power.
56 Schumpeter (1939) notes that the necessary condition for the 
banks to obtain  interest is that there are agents who: “… value a present dollar more than a 
future dollar.” There may be different agents who are willing to pay interest, for example 
consumers who wish to anticipate their consumption, but Schumpeter maintains that the 
fundamental phenomenon which allows b anks to obtain interest is the financing of the 
innovation. Indeed, the innovation allows the entrepreneur to obtain a profit, that is a 
monetary surplus with respect to the production costs, which enable him to pay interest. The 
interest is thus a monetary phenomenon that arises out of the relation between banker and 
entrepreneur: “The exchange, to which interest owes its origin … according to our 
                                                 
52 “The entrepreneur does not save in order to obtain the means which he needs, nor does he accumulate any 
goods before beginning to produce. … The entrepreneur is never the risk bearer.  … The one who gives credit 
comes to grief if the undertaking fails.  … Risk-taking is in no case an element of the entrepreneurial function. 
Even though he may  risk his reputation, the direct economic responsibility of failure never falls on him.” 
Schumpeter 1912, pp. 136-7. 
53 See: Schumpeter 1939. 
54 Keynes 1937a , p. 116   
55 See: Bertocco 2002. 
56 “Interest is the premium of the present purchasing power over the future one” Schumpeter 1912, p. 199.   17 
interpetation … takes place between entrepreneur and bankers”
57 Schumpeter  (1912, p. 225) 
criticises the real interest rate theory which considers interest as a premium for the abstention 
from consumption.
58 According to Schumpeter the monetary nature of the interest rate derives 
from the fact that in the credit market what is exchanged is not goods, but rather purchasing 
power, whose creation by the banks alters the distribution of the ownership of the means of 
production.  
By emphasizing the monetary nature of the interest rate, Schumpeter distances himself 
from the distinction made by Wicksell between a ‘monetary’ rate fixed by the bank, and a 
‘natural’ rate which corresponds to the rate that would be generated in a barter economy in 
which the object of credit is the resources saved. According to Wicksell, the value of the 
natural rate is the point towards which the monetary rate should converge. Schumpeter (1939) 
states that in a capitalist economy there is no natural interest rate. This demonstrates how 
Schumpeter, just like Keynes, holds that the capitalist economy works in a way which is 







In conclusion, we can note that the two theoretical frameworks described analyse the role 
of the financial institutions from different perspectives. The asymmetric information approach 
offers a reassuring  picture of the working of an economy marked by the presence of a 
complex financial structure. This financial structure is considered as the response to the 
imperfections that characterise the real world and that prevent savers from directly financing 
firms. The presence of a complex financial structure eliminates the negative effects connected 
with asymmetric information and allows an efficient allocation of savings. It can be 
concluded that the distinctive element of this approach is the return to the principle of the 
neutrality of the financial variables, as the function of the financial structure is to ensure that 
the real world, with its imperfections, reproduces the results that characterise the ideal world 
without imperfections, in which savers directly finance the firms and the financial institutions 
have no role at all. 
The  Keynes-Schumpeter approach leads us to analyse in a more complicated way the role 
of the financial structure. This approach underlines that bank money, banks, credit market are 
elements that mark an economy that is completely different from the pure exchange economy 
to which the principle of the neutrality of the monetary variables is applied. It is an economy 
in which: 1) the object of the credit market is not the resources saved but the means  of 
payment created by the banks; 2) the credit market is based on the relation between banks and 
firms and not on the relation between savers and firms; 3) there are no automatic mechanisms 
that guarantee the full employment of the resources; 4) the evolution of the economic system 
                                                 
57 Schumpeter 1912, p. 195. 
58 “Unquestionably it is extraordinarily tempting in the case of interest also try to turn away from the element of 
money as quickly as possibile and to carry the explanation of interest into the region where values and returns 
arise, namely in the realm of the production of goods. However, we cannot turn aside. It is true tha in every case, 
corresponding to money interest, that is to the premium on purchasing power, there is a premium on goods of 
some kind. It is true that goos and not ‘money’ are needed to produce in the technical sense. But if we conclude 
from this that money is only an intermediate link, merely of technical importance, and set about susbstituting for 
it the goods which are obtained with it and for which therefore in the last analysis interest is paid, we at once 
lose the ground from under our feet.  … Thus we cannot move away from the money basis of interest.” 
Schumpeter 1912, pp. 183-4.   18 
is determined by the innovations that are made through investment decisions  taken in 
conditions of uncertainty.  
These elements make it possible to highlight the social role of the banks, which do not act 
on behalf of a particular group of economic subjects, but they act on behalf of the entire 
society inasmuch as, by creating money to finance the entrepreneur-innovator, they express 
the consensus of society towards the investment project which is funded. The social 
responsibility of the banks becomes evident when, following Schumpeter, we observe that it 
is the investment decisions financed by the bank that influence the choice of the goods to 
produce and not the preference of consumers, and when we recall that it is society in i ts 
entirety through the banks that assumes the risk of the investment.  
If the dimension that characterizes the asymmetric information approach is that of the 
neutrality of the financial structures, the dimension that marks the Keynes-Schumpeter 
approach is that of consensus: the financial structure is the instrument through which the 
consensus of society in its entirety is expressed about the innovations that are made through 
the firms’ investments.  
The  Keynes-Schumpeter approach has important implications. In the first place, this 
approach leads us to minimize the importance of asymmetric information in explaining the 
characteristics of the financial structure. According to Keynes and Schumpeter, the existence 
of the banks is not explained by the presence of asymmetric information, but it is explained 
by the spread of a fiat money. The Keynes-Schumpeter approach emphasizes the monetary 
role played by the banks, that is, their ability to create new money through credit. Moreover, 
in the presence of uncertainty, the difference between the financial structures of the small-
medium firms with respect to the big firms can be explained on the basis of the selection 
criteria applied by the banks rather than on the basis of the presence of asymmetric 
information.  
 In the second place, this approach leads us to ask questions about the financial structure 
that are not relevant according to the asymmetric information approach. The first question can 
be formulated as follows: given that the banks, in taking their financing decisions, express the 
consensus of society with respect to projects that the firms intend to make, we can ask 
ourselves to what extent can banks represent the aspirations and desires of society as a whole, 
and if there are tools that allow society to express some sort of judgement on the banks’ 
action. We can assume that society on the whole expresses an evaluation of the banks’ 
choices by creating the conditions that permit firms to repay the loans obtained from the 
banks; we can therefore hold that  the banks express a partial consensus towards the 
entrepreneur-innovator when they grant the financing, while the substantial consensus is 
expressed by society as a whole when it puts the firms in a condition to be able to repay the 
loan. This leads us to give importance to the phase of repayment of the loan by the firms; a 
problem to which the asymmetric information approach does not give much importance. The 
reason for this lack of attention is intuitable: if one agrees that the intermediaries’ task is to 
overcome the problems connected with the presence of asymmetric information and to ensure 
that savings are used efficiently, then the problem of repaying the loan fades into the 
background as it is taken for granted that the firms receiving funding are those that have the 
most profitable projects. If, on the other hand, one emphasizes that the decisions of the banks 
are taken in conditions of uncertainty and the investments condition the development of the 
system, then it becomes important to study the factors that put companies in the condition of 
repaying the loans granted. Two references seem to me to be important on this point:  the first 
is Schumpeter’s considerations about the conditions that enable the firms which introduce 
innovations to make profits; the second reference is the analysis of Minsky, the Keynesian   19 
economist who most developed the analysis of the role of financial institutions by specifying 
the conditions that allow firms to repay the loans.  
Moreover we may ask if the degree of consensus on the part of society with regard to the 
financing decisions taken by the financial institutions alters as a result of changes in the 
financial structures. We have seen that Keynes and Schumpeter highlight the central role of 
the banks. The data concerning the financial structure of firms shows how important 
alternative channels of financing are to the banks; in particular, for small firms, the 
importance of self-financing and the financing obtained by non-bank intermediaries that 
operate on private share markets, while for the big firms we can note the importance of 
recourse to financing obtained through the stock market. So we can ask ourselves in which 
way does recourse to these non-bank channels alter the degree of consensus with respect to 
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